571/66 largely in terms of the normal and special political functions of kinship, ceremonial kinship, and friendship. But the cacical association is more than the concatenation of these social structures; it is a distinct political entity with its own patterns of action and its unique goal of power over the community.

667 Let us now turn to these distinctive workings of the cacicazgo. Political sovereignty is exercised primarily by the cacique and his inner core of relatives and friends--eight men in all. They are more or less supported by some twenty lesser leaders. Political matters are informally discussed at length by the leaders and some of the citizens at large. Important policy decisions are made at special meetings, sometimes secretly convened, after a partial decision has been previously reached. Important legal cases are likewise resolved before the court opens by the inner core leaders, especially by the oldest nephew of the cacique. Political decisions at the special meetings are generally by majority vote, but often a majority of the inner eight is enough, and in extreme cases the cacique imposes his will alone. The matters dealt with in special meetings and conversations between the inner leaders are primarily the following: all land distribution questions, public works (especially irrigation problems), the making up of the ballots for formal office, and reprisals against enemies and the quashing of nascent interest groups. Effective government is informal, and a description solely in terms of formal political institutions would miss the main point of Durazno politics.

The informal structure of one cacical group in Durazno has always been paralleled by that of a contending or fallen party with its would-be cacique, secret meetings, and the same patterns of organization. At some times, as during 1927, the two parties have [621] been equal in strength. At other times, as in 1956, the fallen party has contained only an aging leader with a pathetic kinship nucleus and some twenty followers. Durazno, like villages all over Michoacan, has a normal pattern of two or more contending factions, each related independently and informally to other villages and higher structures.

186 578 563 The ethnic factor is often important here. During the agrarian period (1921-26), Durazno and the two other agrarian Indian villages of the valley fought together against the mestizo hirelings and Spanish landlords. A major turning point in Durazno political and cultural history came when opposing Indian factions within the village began using mestizo neighbors against their own "blood." The village agrarian caciques have themselves always been culturally marginal, participants in both Tarascan and mestizo culture. They feel a high ambivalence in both directions: partial rejection of their Indian followers, resentment toward mestizos, and different kinds of identification with both groups.

The village leaders, as political "middlemen" (Wolf, 1956), relate the political demands and supplies of their constituents to the partially complementary demands and supplies of the higher echelons, of the Cardenas machine in the case of Michoacan. In the case of two strong contending factions, both are separately related to two contesting state-wide structures, as during the "serratista" period from 1932 to 1934. The indigenous, factional structure of the village, with its qualities of an ongoing clan vendetta, is sensitively and immediately connected to national "theoretical" questions such as the "decollectivization of the ejidal patrimony" (1925). The national problems translate downward into specific blood-and-soil-issues.[3] The political relation between national structures and nerve-center villages like Durazno is constant and often direct; the Indian cacique goes straight to Mexico City to confer with the national party chairman.

632 661 The formal government in Durazno is divided between the civil and ejidal arms. The three civil officers enjoy slightly more prestige and pervasive power in the community organization and the arbitration of legal cases, while the four ejidal posts are the more

208 stormy agrarian period (1921-26), when the agrarian hero was, by word of mouth, "touch-
66 ing the sensitive parts" of the Tarascan peasantry.

The second method, astute intrigue, follows fairly familiar Machiavellian lines but
661 with a self-conscious sophistication and articulateness that would have delighted the immortal Florentine (Machiavelli, 1942). Intrigue has always been a major, time-consuming political activity in Durazno, and astuteness (astucia) is a personal quality much admired by the cunning leaders. It is true that politics is often infused by the characteristic desperation of peasants struggling for land with a newly activated lust for power; old agrarian fighters recall that after the land reform in 1924 they felt like the "recently arrived." But Durazno politics also has the character for its participants of a fascinating game to be played astutely, in accordance with certain rules and a high sense of art.

667 The third principal method, human organization, received great impetus during the twenties through the formation of regional committees and of "shock brigades," organized on Leninist principles. Leaders today conceive of their role as one of "organizing" and "controlling" the pueblo and the region. The cacique maintains a high threshhold of internal discipline, but the relations between the other leaders are horizontal, loose, and shifting. The importance of relations with higher organizations has already been described.

579 The fourth method, the "diagnostic trait" of violence, assumed the stature of a civil
664 war during the agrarian period when indigenous patterns of blood vengeance and friendship loyalty combined with the ideological justifications of the reform struggle. During the twenty-year factional period from 1926 to 1948, Durazno and the region attained a unique notoriety in the state. Twenty-three cross-checked politically motivated homicides and several times more woundings and armed encounters took place in the three "bad years" from 1937 to 1939 alone. Leaders and ordinary citizens recognize violence as a normal aspect of politics, but today many are sick of it, and the incidence has greatly dropped. Assassinations are usually carried out by the more "valiant" members of a party and are generally directed against the minor figures of opposing parties. The number of active or potential peasant "fighters" in Durazno has always ranged between ten and forty and has been a significant power factor in region and state. The power basis of politics is a comparatively obvious factor here.

171 Much of what we have said here would apply to other forms of caciquismo, including larger, non-Indian, conservative areas, such as Spain. In the Boasian spirit, however, we have limited our inductions to one Mexican Indian cacicazgo. In 1896 Franz Boas wrote: "When we have cleared up the history of a single culture . . . we can then investigate in how far the same causes were at work in the development of other cultures."

NOTES

114 1. Fourteen months of fieldwork were conducted between March, 1955, and July, 1956, under the auspices of the Wenner-Gren Foundation and the Mexican government.

2. Nonparticipants have illegally rented their plots, or are boycotting the cacique, or have withdrawn from politics from fear or weariness.

3. Leaders of opposition factions in the village stand ready to switch and offer a revolutionizing support to a leader who challenges a state or national machine. This automatic village-level support of an opposition leader partially explains the cataclysmic success of Lazaro Cardenas when, in 1934, he turned against national "strong man" Calles.